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Introduction 
After a month long campaign by indigenous and environmental activists to prevent an 
access pipeline from being drilled under the Missouri River in North Dakota, the Army 
Corp of Engineers refused the permit on 4 December 2016, handing initial victory to the 
protesters (Wong 2016). Commenting on this success, Shannon Jackson, Executive  
Director of Our Revolution, a movement to reclaim democracy in the United States, 
stated: 
Today’s decision clearly demonstrates the power of the political revolution. When 
people come together from all walks of life – veterans, Native Americans, envi-
ronmentalists, farmers, young and old – to protect the health of our planet and 
generations to come, there is nothing we cannot accomplish. This victory sends a 
clear signal to those at the top: we are united and not giving up. We will continue 
to stand together and expect the decisions made by our government to benefit all 
of us, not just the rich and corporations. 
 
Not two months later, on 24 January 2017, US president Donald Trump overturned the 
verdict of the experts and ignored the voices of the water protectors by signing the  
executive order to approve the pipeline, demonstrating support for the fossil fuel indus-
try (Eilperin and Dennis 2017). At this time, Trump also hinted at his intention to  
withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement. 
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Across the ocean in Europe, water and earth protectors are resisting the first fracking 
site in Lancashire, UK, after successful local government opposition to Cuadrilla’s  
application to drill for shale gas was overruled by the UK central government (Ambrose 
2017). 
 
Environmental politics, whether national or international, it would seem then, still lies 
in the hands of the state, much in line with traditional, state-centric realist international 
relations (IR) theory. And yet, clearly, other actors have influenced these processes, 
from the water protectors attempting to halt projects, to the gas and oil companies  
successfully lobbying governments to go ahead.  
 
Liberal and critical approaches to IR want to highlight that beyond the realm of inter-
state politics there is an array of actors, such as transnational social movements, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or transnational corporations (TNCs), sometimes 
collectively referred to as non-state actors, transnational actors or civil society actors, 
that have a bearing on politics and political outcomes. Questions about ‘who acts and 
how’ are fundamentally about what constitutes ‘the political’ in global environmental 
politics.  
 
This chapter is concerned with transnational actors in global environmental politics. The 
first section of the chapter starts by locating transnational actors in IR, defining more 
clearly some of the key concepts and how these have evolved over time, and how they 
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relate to developments within the discipline of IR. It further provides some conceptual 
tools for analyzing the role of transnational actors in global environmental politics,  
including contested theoretical approaches and challenges to explaining their signifi-
cance. In particular, it analyzes the sphere of global civil society, where transnational 
actors are said to be located. The second section then focuses on a variety of transna-
tional actors, including transnational environmental movements, NGOs and  
transnational corporate actors. It asks what motivates them and how they act and engage 
in global environmental politics.  
 
Locating transnational actors in international relations 
 
The discipline of IR is notorious for its confusing variety of concepts that are sometimes 
used interchangeably and sometimes mean different things. So, for example, while  
International Relations in its origin was concerned with analyzing the international  
relations between nation-states as well as their interactions with international  
organizations such as the UN (United Nations) or NATO (North Atlantic Treaty  
Organization), more recent scholars now often understand International Relations to be 
about social, economic, cultural or political interactions across the globe. They might 
want to talk about transnational politics, world politics, global politics or indeed global 
political economy. Similarly, the term non-state actor can be confusing. Although  
strictly it appears to be referring to any actor that is not a state or government, the 
boundaries between what constitutes state and non-state are not always clear. For  
example, the UN might be seen as a non-state actor in that it stands alone as an institu-
tion. However, it is clearly an international – indeed intergovernmental – organization 
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and a channel through which states (and other actors) operate. The UN claims moral 
authority over world politics. It is, as it were, the closest body to a world government. 
Some would argue that international organizations, such as the UN, the World Bank, the 
IMF or the WTO, embody a quasi world state that holds a lot of power to direct world 
affairs (see, for example, Shaw 2000). 
 
However, there are many non-state actors who contest this concentrated global power. 
Non-state actors championing a particular issue, such as the environment, are  
challenging nation-states and, by extension, inter-state organizations – claiming they are 
failing to solve global issues. Their aim is to contest the agenda, to point out where 
these institutions are failing, to promote reform of these institutions, to work with these 
organizations, sometimes bypassing the nation-state, and sometimes even calling for 
these organizations to be abolished, as seen, for example, in the ‘WTO - Shrink or Sink’ 
campaign, organized and signed by a transnational, heterogeneous collection of  
networks, associations and NGOs, self-defined as transnational civil society (see, for 
example, TWN, no date). When defining transnational actors, then, we are referring to 
all those non-state actors, such as TNCs, NGOs or social movements, that operate 
across the globe and form part of global politics. They are neither states nor  
international organizations, but they act alongside them, sometimes collaborating with 
and sometimes challenging them, and at other times ignoring them altogether.  
 
The evolution of some of the key concepts to do with understanding transnational actors 
can usefully be related to the historical development of the discipline of IR in general 
and global environmental politics in particular. Within IR, the study of transnational  
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actors came to the fore during the 1970s with the theoretical developments of pluralism 
and complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977). Out of this developed the study 
of international regime theory, which focuses on the importance of institutions and 
shared norms amongst actors (see Vogler, Chapter 1 in this volume). The emphasis in 
this body of literature is on the effectiveness of international institutions that deal with 
transboundary issues and the institutional settings and arrangements as well as power 
structures that enable or constrain international cooperation. In the field of the  
environment, this literature looks particularly at international environmental regimes, or 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) as they are most often referred to. 
While much of regime theory stands accused of state-centrism, there is within this 
school of thought acknowledgement of the role of non-state actors, known as epistemic 
communities. They are transnational networks of knowledge-based experts from the 
world of science, NGOs or business that contribute expertise to the policy-making  
process in particular issue areas, such as the environment, trade or security, which fos-
ters institutional and wider institutional learning (for example Vogler 2003).  
 
From international regimes to global governance 
 
The analytical framework of international regimes has tended to be replaced by that of 
global governance. The concept of governance has become prominent in IR since the 
end of the Cold War. No longer was the world seen as divided into a simple bi-polar 
system maintaining international order. A lot of the literature has focused on how  
processes of globalization are generating a more complex, multi-level world political 
system which implicitly challenges the old Westphalian assumptions about the nation-
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state. Questions about how to govern the new world order have become prominent, not 
least in relation to transboundary issues, such as environmental degradation.  
Governance as a concept is distinguished from government. A government is backed by 
formal authority; by police powers to ensure implementation of policies. Governance, 
on the other hand, is more encompassing than government, including institutions as well 
as non-governmental mechanisms. Held and McGrew (2003: 8) describe governance as 
 
 [T]he structures and processes of governing beyond the state where there 
exists no supreme or singular political authority … it constitutes a broad 
analytical approach to addressing the central questions of political life  
under conditions of globalization, namely: who rules, in whose interests, 
by what mechanisms and for what purposes? 
 
It is thus a vision of a global institutional architecture that is multilayered, pluralistic 
and structurally complex, with national governments still acting as strategic sites for 
enmeshing global governance. The shift from regimes to governance is also visible in 
global environmental politics, and much of the literature now talks about global  
environmental governance as the sphere of global environmental politics (Lipschutz 
1996; Paterson et al. 2003). A move away from state-centric analysis has also occurred, 
with the focus on analyzing transnational environmental movements and NGOs as well 
as TNCs as actors in global environmental politics (see, for example, Princen and Fin-
ger 1994; Lipschutz 1996; Wapner 1996; 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Bestill 2006). 
More recently, the co-creation of global environmental governance between state and 
non-state actors has been described as ‘hybrid multilateralism’ (Bäckstrand et al. 2017).  
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There are a variety of theoretical approaches to global governance. The universalizing 
liberal language of global governance, as seen, for example, in the Report of the UN 
Commission for Global Governance (UNCGG), Our Global Neighbourhood, claims we 
are entering a new era of democratization, economic transformation, multilateralism and 
collective responsibility (UNCGG 1995: 1). While international governance was once 
played out in intergovernmental relationships, Our Global Neighbourhood claims this 
new global era is marked by the involvement of NGOs, citizens’ movements, TNCs, 
and the global market alongside states and intergovernmental organizations (UNCGG 
1995: 3). In the liberal academic literature, too, this inclusion of transnational actors in 
the policy-making process is what is perceived to be new about global governance 
(Young 1997). 
 
Increasing transnational activism is attributed to the perceived powerlessness of the 
state in a globalizing world, particularly when it comes to so-called global issues, such 
as environmental degradation. Alongside the forces of globalization, pressure from 
grassroots movements is seen as a challenge to the power and authority of states 
(UNCGG 1995: 10–11). The response, according to the report, is for the states-system – 
organized around a reinvigorated UN – to welcome these challenges in the form of a 
widened global governance. Non-governmental actors, according to the report, have 
brought about a ‘global associational revolution’ (1995: 253) consisting of ‘a multitude 
of institutions, voluntary associations, and networks ...[which] channel the interests and 
energies of many communities outside government, from business and the professions 
to individuals’ (UNCGG 1995: 32).  
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Alongside NGOs, global business is considered to be an ‘even more clearly identifiable 
sector with a role in global governance’ (UNCGG 1995: 255). Business is seen as being 
‘in the forefront of “futures” research, mapping out long-range global scenarios and  
assessing their implications for corporate responsibility’, following the lead of the  
Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD), which is ‘illustrative of this 
new role’ (Ibid). In this liberal, pluralist account, this wide range of non-governmental 
actors is seen as standing alongside states. Moreover, it is seen as enabling the democra-
tization of global governance. 
 
Critics of the liberal discourse caution that there is a danger of overemphasizing the  
diffusion, or even loss, of state power. The importance and centrality of state  
sovereignty do not disappear. The key institutions remain inter-governmental ones.  
Despite claims that environmental issues, because of their global nature, challenge the 
sovereign, interstate system, and despite claims to be creating some global civil space, 
the political framework of the liberal global political economy has not fundamentally 
altered. While states may appear to have lost autonomy, juridically their claim to sover-
eignty is not undermined (Paterson 1997: 175). Critical voices in the global governance 
debate draw connections to Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian discourse. Here, global 
governance does not mark the retreat of the state, but rather the ultimate form of  
government rationality or, as Foucault termed it, ‘governmentality’, the ‘unspoken  
rationality of neoliberal globalization’ (Douglas 2000: 116). Neo-Gramscians similarly 
liken global governance to a strategy of global capitalist hegemony, a process of institu-
tionalization that stabilizes and perpetuates world order (Cox 1981: 136; Ford 2003: 
122). In these views, global environmental governance is not so much about managing 
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global environmental problems as about perpetuating dominant capitalist structures and 
practices. Yet again, other writers, recognising the complexity and diversity of global 
environmental governance, highlight the role of networks amongst a range of actors, 
deploying Social Network Analysis (SNA) to identify the complex structures of  
networks and how they might enable information flow, coordination and cooperation 
(Paterson 2016). 
 
The space of global civil society 
 
Within the literature on global governance, transnational actors are often said to be  
located within the sphere of global civil society. The concept of civil society itself is an 
old and complex one that has seen shifts over time in its boundaries with state and  
market, also varying theoretically from liberal to critical positions. However, as some 
authors have pointed out, there are problems with constructing bounded spheres due to 
the often transnational dimension of social relations (Shaw 1994). The extrapolation of 
civil society to global civil society is open to different interpretations. Predominantly, it 
is claimed that changing circumstances under conditions of globalization have affected 
non-state actors and the way they organize, as well as who and what they target. The 
sphere in which they are said to be operating has also become globalized. If national 
social movements were located in civil society, now transnational and global social 
movement activism is growing in a sphere of global civil society (see, for example, 
Shaw 1994; Lipschutz 1996). 
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The term global civil society is now widely used amongst social movements, NGOs, 
business as well as government representatives and the institutions of global  
governance. It is actively shaping a political sphere and creating new transnational  
political identities and subjects (Drainville 2004). Some writers see global civil society 
as consisting of ‘self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge and action, by 
decentred local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they were not 
there’ with the aim ‘to reconstruct, re-imagine, or re-map world politics’ (Lipschutz 
1992: 390). In his view, global civil society is a parallel sphere that seeks to bypass the 
state-system and construct ‘new political spaces’ (1992: 393).  
 
This leads to questions about what the sphere of global civil society adds to our analysis 
of transnational actors. Different theoretical viewpoints have different takes on the 
meaning and importance of global governance and global civil society.  
The dominant liberal view, as depicted in documents such as Our Global  
Neighbourhood, envisages a pluralistic, relatively harmonious, emancipatory political 
sphere (see also; Wapner 1997; Kaldor 2003). Liberals refer to it as that ‘domain that 
exists above the individual and below the state but also across state boundaries, where 
people voluntarily organize themselves to pursue various aims’ (Wapner 1997: 66). In 
this view, global governance is constituted by the addition of global civil society to  
international society, made up of both NGOs and business actors. It is portrayed as a 
space of ‘civility’ and not a potential site for conflicting interests.  
 
On the other hand, traditional IR theorists are sceptical about the importance of global 
governance or global civil society (for example Grieco and Ikenberry 2003). They see 
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any institutional mechanisms above the state level as inevitably subject to distortion and 
abuse by the most powerful nation-states who will further their interests through these 
institutions or ignore and bypass them.  
 
Critical voices agree partially with some of the realist analysis about the abuse of such 
institutional mechanisms by powerful states, but they locate the whole scenario within 
global capitalism, seeing powerful states as seeking to expand their control over global 
capitalism, not just for the sake of political power in and of itself. Neo-Gramscians, for 
example, emphasize the role of ideology as well as institutions in maintaining capitalist 
hegemony. Here, the sphere of global civil society is in danger of contributing to the 
enclosure of the global public sphere, by creating an elite space that legitimizes global 
governance. However, the neo-Gramscian view also sees global civil society as a site 
for potential contest to hegemony, and thus a site of struggle and resistance. They see 
global civil society as the terrain where progressive forces are challenging the  
increasing power of capital and seeking to create transnational links and new political 
spaces for mobilizing on global problems such as social injustice and environmental 
degradation (for example Gill 2003). 
 
In line with the perceived transformative potential of global civil society, sections of 
social movements – in particular established NGOs – consciously define themselves as 
members of global civil society, invoking the language of democratization and partici-
pation. They see the sphere of global civil society as a political space for engaging with 
the institutions of global governance in an attempt to make up for the democratic deficit 
that these non-transparent and unaccountable institutions create. Civil society actors 
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clearly are active and important participants in a less state-centric global environmental 
governance, though claims that they democratise, or even lend greater legitimacy, re-
quire careful scrutiny (Bernauer and Betzold 2012; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014), and 
further investigation into the impact of transnational actors shows varying degrees of 
success (Betsill and Corell 2008; McCormick 2011; Newell 2000; Park 2013). 
On the other hand, less institutionalized grassroots movements with radical agendas are 
suspicious of a politics of engagement, which they view as a form of co-optation (Ford 
2003). In the neo-Gramscian view, the establishment of an enlarged liberal sphere of 
global civil society where people can participate in the management of the environment 
is consistent with the notion that civil society is a mechanism of hegemony. In this 
view, civil society’s involvement and perceived contribution to policy making are a 
concession to the people in return for their acquiescence in preserving the dominant  
social, political and economic capitalist model. Further, they see such discourses of 
global civil society as strategies for absorbing and neutralizing potentially counter-
hegemonic ideas (Cox 1993: 55). However, they also stress that civil society is the 
space for change; the space where hegemony is challenged. It is where the struggle over 
environmental policy is played out. Global civil society thus is not only a sphere of  
action, but it has agency, as do the actors operating from the sphere, be they transna-
tional environmental movements, TNCs or transnational business networks. 
 
We saw that there are different interpretations of the phenomenon of global civil society 
and its democratizing potential. While one can argue that there has, indeed, been an  
increase in activity of transnational actors in the sphere of global civil society and, 
therefore, increased participation of these actors in global governance, that does not 
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necessarily translate into democracy; although some argue it could potentially enhance 
democracy within global governance (for example Held and McGrew 2003; Stevenson 
and Dryzek 2014). Reports such as Our Global Neighbourhood may be slightly exag-
gerating the claims of democratization because participation does not necessarily equal 
representation. Here, NGOs are situated in the same sphere as business actors,  
competing for participation in global institutions. Previously, the UN’s Agenda 21 had, 
for the first time ever, called upon the global population to participate in the saving of 
the planet (UN 1992). However, the locus of authority remains entrenched in the inter-
state system, with a growing recognition of the role of business as by far the dominant  
section of this so-called global civil society. Critical scholars view environmental issues 
as being depoliticized through the orthodox discourse of global environmental  
governance building within the liberal global political economy (e.g. Paterson 2000). 
That is to say that environmental problems are separated out from economic and  
political issues, seen as discrete issues that are capable of being fixed through  
institutions, market-based mechanisms or changed behaviour, yet without challenging 
the parameters of the current system. 
 
At heart, the study of the role of transnational actors in global environmental politics is 
about power relations. As we saw above, global environmental governance is the arena 
of global environmental politics. It is here that the global management of transboundary 
environmental issues is fought out. Global civil society is now most readily identified as 
the space in which transnational actors operate. It is portrayed as a democratizing force 
for global governance in the dominant liberal literature. However, critical scholars want 
to deconstruct this space and make the power relations explicit. Ultimately, we might 
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want to ask in what way does an analysis of transnational actors in global environmental 
politics challenge conventional approaches to understanding political outcomes in  
global environmental politics. For this, we now turn to an illustration of a variety of 
transnational actors. 
 
Transnational actors in global environmental politics 
 
The previous section has illustrated the context and space of transnational activism. 
Traditionally, the role of transnational actors in the policy-making process, like in the 
discipline of IR more generally, has not been at the centre of analysis. Although regime 
theory, in its analysis of environmental regimes and multilateral environmental  
agreements, acknowledges epistemic communities as contributors to global environ-
mental politics, the emphasis has been on the role of scientists and technical experts 
contributing expertise to the understanding of environmental issues (Vogler 2003). This 
has been particularly important where controversy or uncertainty has been an issue, for  
example over the phenomenon of climate change. The presence of epistemic communi-
ties, however, has not radically unsettled the state-centricity of regime analysis. While it 
has introduced actors other than states, these have been limited to elite experts. These 
types of elite actors must not be confused with the broader transnational environmental 
movement and might better be described as part of broader advocacy networks (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998). 
 
This section will focus on transnational environmental movements, NGOs and  
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transnational business/TNCs as actors in global environmental politics. It will use the 
concept of NGOs generally, although they are sometimes also referred to as  
International NGOs (INGOs) or Transnational NGOs (TNGOs). Although this book’s 
focus is on global environmental politics, and the focus of this chapter is on the  
transnational actors in global environmental politics, this is not to say that  
environmental issues can be seen in isolation. Indeed, focusing on single issues can be 
counterproductive because it may fail to challenge the fragmented, disciplinary  
technical-rational discourse that is a key contributor to environmental degradation and 
current global environmental governance. If environmental issues are separated out of 
their social, political and economic context, the root causes are rendered invisible,  
leading to techno-fix solutions that may exacerbate the problem (Ford 2003). Indeed, 
concerns amongst transnational actors are rarely limited to discrete environmental  
problems. The analysis of global environmental change and issues of sustainability is 
mostly couched in a much broader framework, looking at the relationship between  
environment and human economic, social, cultural and political development. The 
growing discourse around environmental and ecological justice exemplifies this (Gillard 
et al. 2017). 
 
Transnational environmental movements and NGOs 
 
Particularly since the 1960s, global environmental movements have proliferated with 
the awareness and politicization of environmental degradation and its relationship to the 
wider organization of modern societies in their economic, political and cultural aspects. 
Increased awareness around the connection between globalization and environmental 
  
16 
 
degradation has led movements to take their struggle out of a purely national context. 
The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) is usually  
quoted as the watershed for transnational actor involvement in global environmental 
politics, where close to 1,500 NGOs organized a parallel conference and many more 
movements and NGOs rallied from across the globe. Ten years later, over 6,000  
officially registered NGOs gathered in Johannesburg for the 2002 International Summit 
on Sustainable Development, alongside countless ‘unofficial’ groups and movements. A 
myriad of movements and organizations across the world, from business to NGOs, 
campaigned on climate change around the various Conferences of the Parties COPs 
running up to the Paris Climate Conference in 2015.  
 
It is hard to find a consensus among social movement theorists as to how a social 
movement might be defined. Scholars have challenged the social movement literature 
that has tended to see social movements as bounded by nation-states, or geographically 
limited to regions or cultures, particularly the North (see, for example, Walker 1994; 
Stammers and Eschle 2005). Broadly, social movements, including environmental 
movements, are heterogeneous groups that share collective identity, solidarity and 
common purpose (e.g. Diani 2000). They vary in size, issues and tactics and the envi-
ronmental movement itself spans various shades of green. Despite the diversity of iden-
tities and experiences, these movements do identify commonalities in the experience of 
late capitalist modernity and connections are sometimes forged across space and place. 
Transnational movements, then, are movements that are building transnational coopera-
tion around common goals and purposes (Smith et al. 1997: 59–60). Sydney Tarrow  
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defines them as: ‘ …socially mobilised groups with constituents in at least two states, 
engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state 
other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic 
actor’ (2001: 11). 
 
Thus, transnational environmental movements are movements that are creating  
transnational links and acting transnationally because they perceive the root causes of 
environmental degradation to be tied up with the forces of globalization, such as the  
increasing globalization of capital and, with it, the globalization of governance struc-
tures. That said, there are many movements that campaign solely on national, regional 
or local issues. But, increasingly, there is an awareness of the relationship between the 
local and the global. Indeed, ‘think global act local’ became a prominent slogan within 
the green movement, linking global awareness with the importance of connectedness to 
place and rooted action, as seen, for example, in the Transition Movement (for example 
Griffiths 2009).  
 
Figure 2.1. ‘Women’s Call for Calm’ 15 minute silence at the site entrance at the Preston New 
Road Cuadrilla fracking site, Lancashire, 12 July 2017. Photo courtesy of Peter Yankowski 
 
While many movements campaign on specific issues, it is important to note that the 
boundaries between issues are not necessarily always rigid. Transnational movements 
campaigning on human rights abuses, gender inequality or labour issues often share 
similar concerns and goals to environmental movements, in that their individual causes 
may all in some ways stem from the nature of the current global economic and political 
system. Indeed, many environmental movements would not want to separate the  
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environment and human development. They argue that sustainability and social justice 
go hand in hand.  
 
The terminology for describing transnational movements has varied enormously: for 
example, INGOs, International Social Movement Organizations (ISMOs), international 
pressure groups or interest groups, or transnational advocacy groups or networks (e.g. 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Stammers and Eschle 2005). Within the field of the environ-
ment more specifically, they have been described as environmental transnational  
coalitions (Princen 1995). More broadly, they have been identified as world civic  
politics (Wapner 1996), global citizen action (Edwards and Gaventa 2001) or people’s 
movements (Shiva 2005). Many movements have identified globalized capitalist  
structures and distant, unaccountable governance structures as part of the problems they 
care about and have identified themselves as anti-globalization movements, anti-
capitalist movements, pro-democracy movements, and global justice movements or, 
more boldly, the ‘movement of movements’ (Mertes 2004).  
 
There is a danger of conflating organizations with movements (Stammers and Eschle 
2005). The environmental movement broadly conceived contains a wide variety of 
groupings. While some NGOs could be seen to be located on a spectrum within the  
environmental movement, it is not the case that all NGOs are part of the movement as 
such. Some large, established NGOs, such as IUCN (International Union for the  
Conservation of Nature) or the WWF (World-Wide Fund for Nature), have a high  
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degree of cross-fertilization with established institutions of governance. These large, 
bureaucratic, professional environmental NGOs are far removed from the grassroots of 
the environmental movement, though they may share common concerns. 
Others, such as pressure groups like Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace, are financially 
independent of governmental institutions and sometimes take an anti-state position as 
well as lobbying at the state and inter-state level. As such, they have a two-pronged  
approach. On the one hand, they have been involved, along with organizations such as 
IUCN and WWF, in setting and monitoring the implementation of institutional  
responses, in the context of international environmental regime formation and  
maintenance and within the United Nations as well as within national governments or at 
the EU level. On the other, they are working in solidarity with grassroots environmental 
movements, sometimes taking direct action (Young 1999; Ford 2003). 
 
Grassroots movements are largely marginalized from institutional processes, often by 
choice. They might not fit neatly into a ‘transnational’ category because they may be 
campaigning on a particular local issue and may lack resources to network  
transnationally. However, they clearly identify transnational structures as the root cause 
of environmental destruction. Movements such as Via Campesina, Climate Camp or 
Earth First! are challenging the top-down governance process through direct action. 
They are highly critical of the institutional channels available and their responses to  
environmental problems. They are also critical of institutionalized environmental NGOs 
that they see as co-opted by the dominant powers of global governance. These grass-
roots activist movements perceive themselves to be engaged in an emancipatory  
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struggle for freedom from dominating discourses to pursue alternative, equitable and 
sustainable ways of living, working for a redistribution of power and carving out  
political space. Their strategy is not necessarily to influence the agenda of the global 
governance process but rather to take direct action to increase awareness about issues 
and to directly challenge and confront the state and economic powers that be. Although 
they may be active in specific places and localities, they are forging transnational links 
through networks such as the Peoples’ Global Action or the World Social Forum  
(Williams and Ford 1999; Ford 2003; Mertes 2004). The movement of movements 
could be seen as the transnational heart of a large variety of groups and movements 
across the globe. Within this movement, diverse groups from across the globe are  
campaigning for the preservation of economic, political, cultural and ecological  
diversity, which they perceive to be under threat from a globalizing monoculture (see 
Shiva 1993; Gill 2003). 
 
The intention here is not to measure which movements have been most successful in, 
for example, lobbying the institutions of global governance or attempting to shut them 
down. Rather, the emphasis is on the political and cultural process of activism and the 
impediments which may be preventing successful outcomes, and on the portrayal of 
these movements as agents of change. Indeed, instrumentally, these movements may be 
relatively powerless compared to large business lobby groups. However, there is a  
powerful, cultural element to the movements for social change, which through global 
action and the global media, are spreading new discourses and challenging existing 
ones. 
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Importantly, movements do not just arise as a means to an end but are actively engaged 
in processes of socio-cultural change, bringing forth alternative ways of knowing and 
doing. Progressive movements are thus not just challenging the organization of the 
global political economy but actively showing what an alternative could look like. This 
cultural aspect of social movements is something that has been largely ignored in social 
movement theory that focuses on the reasons for mobilization of collective behaviour. 
Melucci (1996) has warned that social movements must not be reduced purely to a  
political dimension for this would deny the communicative role they play (p. 2). His 
project is concerned with analyzing the actors’ construction of their own action (1996: 
16), the actual processes of cultural change. Yet, such an approach must not lose sight 
of the context, which remains the global political economy. Social movements need to 
be reflexive about their position within this hegemony as well as the dangers of co-
optation. As seen above, they need to be able to contextualize their agency within the 
global matrix. 
 
TNCs and business advocacy groups 
 
Like transnational environmental movements and NGOs, TNCs have mushroomed in 
the last three decades, and they constitute important players in the modern, hyper-
globalized capitalist world economy, responsible for large amounts of investment and 
trade. A TNC is a corporation that is active in more than two countries – that is, it may 
have a host state, but it operates subsidiaries in various other locations and involves the 
movement of capital, resources and people across national boundaries. Examples might 
include oil corporations such as Shell or BP, or food giants such as Unilever or Nestle. 
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Apart from TNCs, though, there are also related business advocacy groups who act in 
the interests of transnational business, such as the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) or the Eu-
ropean Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), to name a few examples. 
 
TNCs and business advocacy networks are clearly important transnational actors in 
global environmental politics because of the close link between the global economic 
system and global environmental degradation. Unlike transnational movements and 
NGOs, they are pursuing instrumental goals rather than acting on principled beliefs 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Clapp 2005b). They are motivated by profit, which leads to 
the growth imperative and resulting increased demand on resources that can contribute 
directly to environmental degradation, given that many TNCs are operating in environ-
mentally sensitive sectors, such as natural resource extraction. While some TNCs invest 
in and produce environmentally benign goods and services, generally trade and invest-
ment patterns within the capitalist global economy tend to exacerbate, rather than miti-
gate, environmental degradation due to the growth imperative. The distantiated  
processes of global capitalism, including the activities of TNCs, contribute both directly 
and indirectly to processes of environmental degradation. This leads to a tension  
between global environmental governance as pursued through MEAs and the freedom 
to do business. TNCs and transnational business advocacy networks acting on their be-
half are eager to minimize regulation that is designed to limit environmental (and social) 
degradation. Fundamentally, then, there is a conflict of interest between their aims and 
those of global environmental policy. Like NGOs, they are involved in lobbying within 
the global environmental policy-making process, though they are often pursuing very 
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different outcomes from those of NGOs. While NGOs and social movements may be 
seeking to challenge the very culture of capitalist relations that systematically produce 
environmental degradation and social injustice, TNCs are attempting to influence the 
agenda to prevent measures that could be harmful to business. There is no denying the 
power of TNCs, as some TNCs have greater assets than nation-states. However, not all 
commentators see TNCs as necessarily an obstacle to sustainable development. Some 
argue that these assets can be used to positively contribute to sustainable development, 
such as through the transfer of innovative and clean technology and the investment in 
infrastructure and job creation (Murphy and Bendell 1997, Herman, Chapter 9 in this 
volume). In this way, the world has seen a greening of some businesses. 
 
The greening of business or greenwash? 
 
Apart from official lobbying in opposition to global environmental policy, business has 
also been very busy recreating itself as a vanguard of sustainable development 
(Schmidheiny 1992; ICC 1991). The institutionalization of this concept is not limited to 
governments and international organizations. In addition to UN documents and  
government policies, the concept of sustainable development has entered the corporate 
world. However, business is not blind to the environmental movement’s criticisms and, 
in the concept of sustainable development, has found a way to discursively integrate  
environmental problems without substantially changing its social and material produc-
tive practices. The link between economic growth and environmental degradation  
remains solid, despite the corporate sector’s promotion of sustainable development (ICC 
1991). 
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During the 1992 UNCED conference, business was brought on board and the WBCSD 
(formerly the BCSD) was born. This lobby group managed to ensure that, during  
official negotiations, the role of business in environmental degradation was played 
down. Agenda 21, signed at UNCED as a comprehensive blueprint for global action on 
sustainable development (UN 1992), only mentions corporations in order to emphasize 
their role in sustainable development but eschews any mention of the need for business 
to be regulated. More fundamentally, at the same time as UNCED was being held, UN 
reforms were underway that dismantled the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) (Clapp 2005a: 25). Attempts by the UNCTC to include corpo-
rate accountability measures within Agenda 21 had been rejected by industrialized 
countries during preparatory meetings. The controversy over the lack of provisions in 
Agenda 21 regarding corporations was further enhanced by the fact that corporations 
such as ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries) and ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Company), 
major environmental polluters with a track record of funding anti-environmental lobby 
groups, were found to be contributing to the funding of UNCED itself (Doran 1993; 
Chatterjee and Finger 1994). 
 
Critical voices would argue that business is using the discourse of sustainable  
development as a way of subverting environmental concerns through greenwash (Beder 
1997). As far back as 1984, UNEP (the United Nations Environment Programme) and 
ICC organized the World Industry Conference on Environmental Management 
(WICEM), which three years prior to the Brundtland Report’s promotion of sustainable 
development, was discussing the possibility of achieving economic growth and sound 
environmental management. The position was a distinctly corporatist one. At WICEM, 
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it was recommended that industry should become more strongly involved in formulating 
environmental policy in general, as well as in formulating national environmental regu-
latory frameworks (Trisoglio and ten Kate 1991). By 1991, in the run up to UNCED, 
WICEM II was clearly carving out the niche for industry in defining and spearheading 
their particular model of sustainable development. 
 
As part of this quest, WICEM II further called on business and industry to foster  
harmonious relations with local communities in order to gain their confidence and to 
become better integrated into the community and wider society. The result of WICEM 
II was The Business Charter for Sustainable Development: Principles for Environmen-
tal Management, adopted in 1990 and first published in 1991. This states, for example,  
 
economic growth provides the conditions in which protection of the envi-
ronment can best be achieved, and environmental protection ... is neces-
sary to achieve growth that is sustainable...In turn, versatile, dynamic, re-
sponsive and profitable businesses are required as the driving force for 
sustainable economic development and for providing managerial, tech-
nical and financial resources to contribute to the resolution of environ-
mental challenges. Market economies, characterised by entrepreneurial 
initiatives, are essential to achieve this...making market forces work in 
this way to protect and improve the quality of the environment – with the 
help of standards such as ISO 14000, and judicious use of economic in-
struments in a harmonious regulatory framework – is an ongoing chal-
lenge that the world faces in entering the 21st century. 
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It is clear from this passage that business, in line with conventional economic ortho-
doxy, perceives environmental degradation to be something outside of economic  
processes. The environment is something that is separate from, and that impinges on 
and challenges, economic and corporate structures and processes. Business and growth 
cannot be questioned in themselves, the task is to ‘manage’ the challenges within the 
given framework. Business is clearly bidding for its narrow view of sustainable  
development to be implemented and for business to take on a major role in the  
implementation. While, on the one hand, aiming to become more closely integrated with 
community and society, business is actually lobbying for autonomy and self-regulation 
or, at most, market-based instruments such as carbon-trading. 
 
The privatization of global environmental governance 
 
Another key dynamic in the provision of global public goods has been that of public 
authority versus private power. Global governance has sometimes involved a shift away 
from public authority to private agencies, as seen, for example, in the public–private 
partnerships such as Global Compact, which includes over 4,700 corporate participants 
as well as stakeholders from over 130 countries. At heart, it advocates responsible  
corporate citizenship to the challenges of globalization in the areas of human rights,  
labour, environment and anti-corruption, contributing to a more sustainable and  
inclusive global economy (UNGC no date).  
 
Likewise, business advocacy groups, such as WBCSD, and institutions, such as the  
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International Organization for Standardization (ISO), promote voluntary codes of  
conduct that, as well as safeguarding the autonomy of business, also implicate business 
in environmental management. The growth in voluntary codes of conduct is blurring the 
boundary between public and private and leading to what has been called ‘mixed  
regimes’, involving states and private authorities in the ‘creation and maintenance of 
international principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures’ (Clapp 1998: 
295). 
 
There has been a tension between the general liberalization and deregulation trend in the 
globalized political economy on the one hand and the growing need for environmental 
regulation on the other, which has led to a search for ‘new and private forms of  
(environmental) regulation, such as (environmental) standards ... as a way out of this 
tension between deregulation and re-regulation’ (Finger and Tamiotti 1999: 9). On the 
one hand, there has been a move from traditional ‘command and control’ style policy to 
an increased privatisation of environmental politics involving the private sector and 
non-state actors (see also Clapp 1998). On the other, there is an argument that a funda-
mental reorganization of international society is taking place, as seen in the growth of 
global governance (Finger and Tamiotti 1999).  
 
A privatization of environmental governance is taking place, as seen in the growing in-
fluence of private actors on decision making, which in some cases, is outweighing the 
influence of states. Evidence suggests that more and more private actors are initiating 
regimes which are later recognized by states and incorporated into their regulatory 
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structures, one example being the ISO 14000 series, which specifies environmental 
management standards (Clapp 1998). In line with the mainstream belief that global  
environmental problems demand global solutions, the notion of global standards would 
seem an essential basis upon which to build harmonized global solutions. However, also 
in line with the mainstream, it ignores the unequal power structures within the global 
political economy. The membership of ISO, true to its hybrid nature, consists of a  
mixture of governments, mixed public–private actors and private industry associations. 
The government members are predominantly made up of developed countries, while the 
private members’ majority come from within the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development). Given that the decision-making process is heavily 
dominated by private interests, the voice of developing countries in the establishment of 
these global standards is marginalized (Clapp 1998: 296–301).  
 
The idea of establishing environmental standards within the remit of ISO was a  
response to Agenda 21’s recommendation for the role of industry in sustainable devel-
opment (Clapp 1998: 302). The setting up of environmental management standards in-
volved a change of direction from the ISO’s traditional remit of technical standards 
(Finger and Tamiotti 1999: 12).  
 
The shift towards global standards must further be seen in the context of trade liberali-
zation and the WTO (World Trade Organization). The WTO’s Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) encourages the use of international standards rather than  
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national ones, which are seen as technical barriers to trade (Finger and Tamiotti 1999: 
13; Clapp 1998: 305). In effect, the ISO environmental management standards, which 
were recognized by the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), create a  
lowest common denominator and act as a mechanism for avoiding trade barriers. More 
importantly, they demonstrate the role of privately agreed voluntary standards in the  
re-regulation and public management of international trade.  
 
With the latest global crisis in neoliberal capitalism and a seeming return to neo-
Keynsian style intervention, some green voices are proposing a ‘Green New Deal’ as a 
solution to the interlinked crises of capital, energy and climate. This would involve 
business and government as well as labour and environmental movements in bringing 
about a shift to green energy and green collar jobs financed by re-regulating finance and 
taxation (GNDG 2008). 
 
From the above, we can see that transnational environmental movements and TNCs and 
their advocates and lobbyists are all clearly visible actors in global environmental  
politics. The question of the power of these diverse actors in global civil society is a 
complex one. For one, we have seen that this sphere includes a large variety of different 
types of actors – NGOs, transnational advocacy groups, TNCs, social movements. The 
liberal pluralist descriptions of this sphere do not analyze power relations within civil 
society. It seems questionable that business actors and NGOs are working on an equal 
footing. Business actors clearly have more ‘tacit power’ over state actors due to their 
close connection to economic growth creation (Newell 2000: 159). Further, amongst 
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NGOs themselves, there are differentiations that cannot be ignored. NGOs, like social 
movements, are not a homogeneous, or necessarily a progressive, force and are not  
immune to power relations of class, race or gender or between North and South and are 
further differentiated on the basis of ideologies and strategies. Critical voices, on the 
other hand, embrace the diversity and complexity of the sphere, seeing it as a site of 
struggle for hegemony as well as counter-hegemony.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of transnational actors and their agency in global 
environmental politics. Over the last two decades, we have seen a growing literature on 
the role of transnational actors in world politics. Few IR scholars would argue that they 
are completely irrelevant. Most would agree that transnational actors need to be part of 
the analysis in understanding the framework and processes of global politics.  
Transnational actors are, of course, a broad church, encompassing anything from trans-
national social movements to global business. They do not all operate on the same foot-
ing, nor do they employ the same tactics to achieve their goals. Different theoretical 
perspectives provide different analyses of how and why transnational actors matter to 
global environmental politics. Solving global environmental problems is clearly a polit-
ical as well as an economic, cultural and social struggle. States are not the only actors in 
this arena, and it is clear that transnational actors are an important part of the picture. 
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